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THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE POLARIZATION OR PLURALISM
The Pitfalls of Polarized Thinking
Since the American revolution, American opinion has polarized around two 
conflicting images of what the proper relation should be between the United 
States and Europe The first, which dominated American foreign policy until 
this century, pictured the destiny of the United States and the European nations 
as separable and divisible Isolation from European politics was pursued to 
advance American security and economic Interests and to insulate American 
democratic institutions from what were perceived as Europe s authoritarian and 
corrupting ways. President George Washington's Farewell Address, warning 
against entangling alliances, became what is now understood as old testament 
doctrine in American foreign policy
We know now that isolationism worked as long as the United States enjoyed 
physical isolation from Europe, the protection of the British navy, and a 
favorable balance of power on the Continent Freed from the intrigues of 
European diplomacy— "the pest of the peace of the world,"1 as Jefferson 
decried— American energies could be directed toward conquering a new continent 
The burden of constructing and maintaining a provisional global order fell to 
the European states
Two world wars, a worldwide economic depression, the collapse of the 
Eurocentric system, and the rise of the Soviet Union as a superpower prompted an 
opposed vision of inseparable and indivisible security, economic, and political 
interests between the United States and Europe President John T Kennedy s 
vision of an Atlantic Community, shared by his postwar predecessors in office,
2became the new testament of American foreign policy
The ideal of an Atlantic Community was affirmed at the very time that 
public interest in pursuing thi6 objective was waning By the late 1950s, 
several major structural changes in world politics profoundly weakened 
incentives for greater U S -European cooperation, although the need for improved 
coordination of transatlantic policies had not diminished and, in many areas, 
like economic assistance to the developing world, had become more urgent 
Sputnick heralded superpower nuclear parity and raised anew European fears, 
temporarily stilled by the formation of the Atlantic Alliance and its link to 
the American nuclear monopoly, of the credibility of the American security 
guarantee The creation of the European Economic Community signalled rot only 
the formal end of the American-inspired recovery program for Europe but also the 
assertion of European economic interests different from, and even opposed to, 
those of the United States The Suez crisis also signified that European and 
American views about how North-South relations should be organized were sharply 
at odds, a perception since reinforced by the Vietnam experience and Europe s 
efforts to distance itself from that conflict and fron American policy toward 
the developing world
Neither the image of divisible or indivisible interests and values well 
describes the parlous state of current American-European relations nor provides 
a reliable formula for encouraging cooperation and managing conflict within the 
Atlantic arena A more sensible way to proceed in rationalizing 
American-European relations than one of exaggerating or discounting the identity 
of American and European interests and values is (1) to recognize what binds 
Americans and Europeans together, (2) to identify where they differ, and (3) to 
adjust differences with minimal damage to core values— an even with an eye to
3exploiting mutual advantages from the pluralistic system that has evolved in the 
West
I Focus on Core Values
First, what binds7 The United States and Europe must cooperate since 
neither alone is capable of creating an international environment congenial to 
the promotion of their respective, if sometimes incompatible, interests in 
national security, economic welfare, and democratic values While the burdens 
and benefits of mutual dependency have varied over time between these two not 
always willing partners, their need for each other has never been greater 
There is no currently available alternative to U S power to deter a Soviet 
attack on Europe, nor to balance Soviet political influence as a consequence of 
Moscow s conventional and nuclear superiority in the European theatre The 
presence of almost 300,000 American troops in Europe is hostage to American 
Intent to defend Europe, with nuclear weapons if necessary They are a more 
reliable gauge of American commitments than conflicting verbal assurances issued 
from the White House by passing presidents We often forget, moreover, that 
American military presence in Europe ensures the desired outcome of World War 
II, registered in the Berlin accords of the early 1970s The lasting defeat of 
Germany s century-long effort to dominate the European continent and the 
legitimation and integration its two parts into two rival blocs
If the European segment of the Atlantic grouping were permitted to fall 
under the dominant influence of a single power, the American people would suffer 
the loss of enormous military capabilities and economic resources as well as 
access to the proven political talents of the West European democracies 
American interests also depend on the expansion of Furope s role in developing a 
viable world order, in motoring economic development (together the United States
and the West European states produce most of the world s wealth), and in 
preserving open societies and in extending human rights
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II Structural Flaws in the Western Edifice 
These core values should not obscure the serious differences that split the 
Western democracies Unless these differences are squarely faced, internal 
conflict threatens the fragile structure that has been painstakingly constructed 
to protect and foster Western cooperation At their most general level, 
Europeans and Americans differ fundamentally over the requirements of Western 
security, the terms of economic development, and the political principles that 
should guide East-West and North-South relations
Defense vs Deterrence Since the 1950s, Europeans and Americans have 
repeatedly clashed over military strategy and the proper mix of conventional and 
nuclear weapons needed for Western security Europeans have consistently 
emphasized deterrence over defense They have little interest and less 
enthusiasm for American suggestions that NATO be prepared to fight a lengthy 
conventional war They have resisted American pressures to increase the size 
and readiness of conventional forces to underwrite a full-fledged flexible 
response strategy in Europe Whereas American strategists believe that such a 
posture is more credible than the early use of nuclear weapons, Europeans fear 
that enhanced conventional forces and the West e announced willingness to use 
them against low-level aggression dim Soviet perceptions of the West s 
determination to use nuclear weapons and may, unwittingly, encourage the very 
attack that NATO preparedness is designed to preclude They worry also that 
they will be the victims of a war fought by the superpowers on their soil 
^Europeans want the American nuclear threat to be committed at the onset of 
hostilities to deter a Soviet attack and minimize the temptation of an implicit
5superpower agreement to limit their military exchanges to the European 
continent The unwillingness of Europe s populations to shoulder the high costs 
of conventional forces during peacetime have also bolstered the resistance of 
their governments to American overtures to strengthen NATO s nonnuclear arms
The NATO proposal to install 572 cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe 
deepens the split between the U S and Europe in still other ways Former 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was first to call attention to the possible 
de-coupling of the European theatre from the Soviet-American global balance if 
the Soviet Union s installation of SS-20 missiles and the deployment of Backfire 
bombers in western Russia went unanswered by NATO The Carter administration s 
decision to exempt theatre nuclear weapons (TNF), like Soviet SS-20 missiles and 
the Backfire bomber, from SALT II negotiations and to entertain restrictions on 
the transfer of cruise technology to European allies in NATO further fueled 
European anxieties about de-coupling
The NATO two-track decision of December 1979 responded to several European 
concerns The proposed deployment of 572 missiles closed what Europeans 
perceived was a gap in NATO s deterrence posture A Soviet attack on NATO bases 
would presumably trigger NATO s threatre nuclear forces (TNF) and activate 
American strategic forces The Soviet Union would not be spared nuclear 
retaliation by NATO forces, and the United States, in control of these TNF 
capabilities, would be engaged from the start of hostilities, narrowing, if not 
eliminating, the possibility that an American president might temporize or 
withdraw American forces in a crisis
The other track of the NATO TNF decision was designed to couple SALT and 
theatre nuclear arms talks and give the Furopeans some say in both The 
willingness of NATO to modify downward and even retract its deployment decision
6if the Soviet Union followed suit provided at least partial entry of the 
European states into superpower nuclear arms negotiations and implicitly 
hampered Washington and Moscow from isolating the European theatre in their 
agreements on a new nuclear balance European supporters of the two-tr^ck 
decision also hoped that a LATO posture favoring a negotiated settlement with 
the Soviet Union would offset domestic critics opposed to new nuclear weapons in 
Europe If Soviet SS-20 and Backfire bombers could be reduced or eliminated, 
then the deterrence gap would close Itself If the Soviets proved intransigent, 
the number of missiles to be deployed in Europe was still small enough that the 
European or superpower nuclear balance would not be destabilized, yet the TNF 
force would be large enough to commit American nuclear power and strengthen 
American-European coupling of theatre and central nuclear forces Meanwhile, a 
bona fide arms control initiative would disarm domestic opponents, particularly 
Leftist opinion bent on a neutralist or unilateralist disarmament course 
The refusal of the Reagan administration to ratify SALT II and its 
determination to embark on nuclear rearmament shredded the delicate tissue of 
expectations underlying qualified European support for the two-track decision 
The proposed TNF deployments appeared in Europe to be a part of the American 
rearmament effort to re-establish the American-Soviet nuclear balance that was 
perceived in Washington as having tilted in Moscow s favor Cruise and Pershing 
missiles were also viewed in Europe as part of the new administration s campaign 
to substitute a war-fighting strategy for the posture of mutual assured 
destruction (MAD) that was the foundation for American nuclear policies 
throughout much of the 1960s and 1970s The Europeans faced the worst of all 
.worlds a destabilizing arms race, the deterioration of East-West detente, 
reduced prospects for genuine arms control and disarmament accords, and
7heightened criticism at home for having tied European interests to expansionist 
American military policies President Reagan s proposal for a zero-option did 
little to quiet European concerns The conditions set by Washington appeared to 
many in Europe to be too stiff to bring the Soviet Union to the bargaining 
table
Detente vs Deterrence Besides differences over defense and deterrence 
Europeans and Americans don t see eye-to-eye over detente For Europeans, 
detente signifies an end in itself and, with progress in arms control and 
increased economic and cultural exchange, an instrument of peace Many 
Americans feel that they received little or nothing from detente, many argue 
further that detente was a snare, permitting the Soviet Union to gain the 
military upperhand, to tighten its grip over Eastern Furope (Poland), and to 
expand its influence in the Third World (African Horn, Angola, Afghanistan) 
Europeans meanwhile want to conserve real gains increased trade and access to 
energy supplies, resolution of boundary disputes, legitimation of the military 
outcome of World War II— a divided Germany— and German recognition of this fait 
accompli, greater opportunity for cultural and personal contacts between East 
and West European governments and peoples, and creation of a process— the 
Conference on European Security and Cooperation— to advance East-West accord
Germans, specifically, have benefited from detente Over 300,000 Germans 
were repatriated from the East, West Berlin s legal status and ties to West 
Germany were regularized, families between East and West Germany were re-united 
and freer contacts were permitted between the two Germanies, including thousands 
of previously prohibited daily telephone calls Europeans are understandably 
reluctant to put these gains at risk This attitude partly explains their 
reticence when Washington assails Soviet pressures on Poland, urges Europeans to
8join an armed crusade against Moscow, and saber rattles at tiny Nicaragua and 
Libya During the hostage dispute with Iran, for example, the Europeans 
responded slowly to requests for support against the Khomeini regime Fearing 
Soviet intervention, the Europeans preferred conciliation over military threats 
or retaliation German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reminded the Carter 
administration that, while the United States had 50 hostages in Iran, there were 
18 million hostages in East Germany
Economic Development Economic interdependence between Europe and the 
United States should not be confused with the notion of identical economic 
interests or a singular view about how joint interests should be promoted The 
range and significance of the issues dividing Europe and the United States over 
economic policy is formidable— and growing A glance at the European-American 
agenda suggests the dimensions of the gulf First, there s the question of 
economic philosophy Europe forms a major trading bloc at odds with the free 
trade perspective that has dominated American trade thinking since World War II 
The European preferential system was tolerated— even encouraged— by American 
administrations during the 1950s and 1960s as a vehicle of European unity A 
partial trade-off was struck between a unified Europe and a global economic 
order based on liberal trading principles Now that European unity no longer 
appears in the immediate offing, the United States faces a powerful trading 
bloc, potentially adverse to its economic interests, with no compensating 
movement toward European political unity American products, like foodstuffs, 
have to vault discriminatory Furopean tariffs or quota barriers They also 
experience greater difficulty than before in penetrating markets outside of 
Europe because of preferential arrangements between developing states and the 
European Community (EC)
9Furope must trade to stay alive For the major EC states (Germany, Italy, 
France, and Britain) total trade (exports and imports) is valued at over AO 
percent of GNP For some of the smaller states (Benelux) it is over 85 percent 
The comparable figures for the United States is around 20 percent (but rising) 
These figures suggest some of the underlying reasons why Washington and 
European capitals disagree over trade policy toward Eastern Europe The U S 
tends to use trade as a political club over the Soviet Union whether in denying 
grain under the Carter administration or in restricting technology under the 
Reagan regime Europeans want more trade with the East to promote detente and 
their economic interests The West European share of the Eastern bloc market is 
about 30 percent, the American portion is a tenth of this level It is no 
wonder then that Europeans refused to accede to American demands to cancel the 
multi-billion oil pipeline contract with the Soviet Union In exchange for 
Russian natural gas, countries, like France and Germany, will meet up to 15 
percent of their energy needs— no serious threat to their national security if 
Soviet sources are cut off Meanwhile, trade flows will swell between the two 
Europes Increased trade is also a key to Eastern Europe s longterm liquidation 
of it8 foreign debts Almost 90 percent of East Europe s debt is owed to 
Western Europe Only about five percent is held in the United States
American-European competition in high technology markets should also be 
noted These include nuclear energy, avionics and space, electronics, and arms 
All of these areas have significant security dimensions All also represent 
important advanced technology sectors whose prospects for longterm growth appear 
bright For example, Furopeans view American nuclear proliferation policy or 
restrictions on high technology trade with Fastern Europe as efforts to limit 
the development of Furopean technology and industry Having broken the II S
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monopoly in civilian nuclear energy, Europe is not prepared to relinquish 
lucrative markets in the developing world to conform either to American security 
requirements or economic interests Sales of electronic equipment to Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union have not been welcomed in Washington There is also 
little sympathy in Washington for European arms sales to Middle East Arab 
states, like Libya or Iraq, to finance needed oil imports Nor have European 
efforts to break the American hold on the world civilian aircraft market been 
viewed with equanimity Witness the legal battles over Concorde's entry into 
American airspace and the application of technical restrictions on purchases of 
the European Airbus by American airlines Atlantic tensions over technology 
transfers reflect more than differences over strategies in dealing the Eastern 
bloc At stake, too, are the rate and size of domestic economic growth, levels 
of employment, and social stability— factors whose value depends significantly 
on increasing a nation s share of the world market for advanced technology 
products and services
Organizing the World Americans also tend to forget how quickly the world
has changed for Europeans World War II and decolonization destroyed the
Eurocentric system Within the short breath of a lifetime that fragile system 
has been replaced by a new constellation of power centers, including two 
superpowers, the developing world, and new centers of economic productivity, 
like Japan, and West Furope itself as an incipient polity Europe s political 
fall, with its attendant feelings of psychological displacement, still grates on 
European leaders and is a source, admittedly of less force today than at the 
height of decolonization, of U S -European frictions
- More substantive are disagreements over the principles that should guide 
the future organizations of nation-state relations and the role of military
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force in creating a tolerable world order On the first score, American policy 
has tended to view the struggle with the Soviet Union as an ideological battle 
of global proportions Conflicts in the developing world— the African Horn, the 
Middle East, Southeast Asia, and, more recently, Central America— have been seen 
through the prism of a struggle against Communist expansionism Europeans are 
no less interested than many developing states in keeping the superpower 
struggle out of the Third World They have also been more accommodating than 
either superpower to ideological pluralism Much to Washington s annoyance 
France cultivates the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and condemns Pinochet s 
Chile European states are also more disposed to deal with radical regimes, 
like Khaddafy s Libya and Khomeini s Iran, partly because of dependency on 
Persian Gulf oil (577 of Persian Gulf oil goes to Western Europe to fill 
approximately 30 percent of its oil needs against 30 and 5 percent, 
respectively, for the U S )
On the score of intervention, Europeans are wary of American use of 
military force in the developing world With some justification, they believe 
that 6uch moves polarize the world into two camps, touch off 
superpower-sponsored arms races, and increase the changes of global 
conflagration arising from a local conflict whose sources may be unrelated to 
the superpower struggle These consideration explain further European 
temporizing over Afghanistan and the African Horn, sympathy for the Arab cause 
over Israel, and criticism of American proposals, like the Rapid Deployment 
Force, to counter Soviet military expansion in the developing world
III Pluralism at Work
It is easy to become obsessed with Western division There s much to be 
worried about Predictions about the West s coming demise, however, may be
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premature The Western democracies defeated Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, 
mounted a successful defense against the Soviet Union, managed, albeit 
infelicitously, the decolonization of the developing world, and spurred a level 
of economic growth unparalleled in history West Germany and Japan have joined 
the ranks of the democracies India, Israel— now Spain and Portugal— are 
counted among the friends of popular government Others are at the threshold of 
Increased popular rule thanks to Western aid These impressive achievements owe 
their success to a shared recognition of what binds, not divides, the West It 
may be useful to remind ourselves that Western pluralism ha6 worked and that it 
can be made to work better
Defense, Deterrence, and Detente Americans tend to forget that Europe has 
done a great deal— by some measures, more than the United States— in providing 
for its own defense Furopeans provide over 70 percent of the manpower, 
divisional strength, combat aircraft (much of it American made), and tanks for 
the central front While the United States clearly outspends the European 
states for defense, the European contribution has not been negligible although 
below what Washington might want The European share of over-all NATO 
expenditures rose from approximately 23 percent in 1969 to 42 percent in 1979 
During much of this same period, European defense expenditures, measured as a 
percentage of GNP in constant dollars, remained stable while American 
expenditures declined The United States is again surging ahead, but other 
countries, like France, are also Increasing their defense expenditures
Europeans have also held firm on key, and controversial, defense issues 
The two-track decision remains NATO s position European governments have drawn 
more fire from their domestic opponents over their stance on this issue than the 
Reagan administration from its critics at home They have also run greater
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political risks in holding the line Italy is quietly preparing bases in Sicily 
for cruise missiles if they are deployed The Thatcher government will deploy 
American cruise missiles in England if arms control negotiations with the Soviet 
Union break down Mitterrand s France, while out of NATO, has supported the TNF 
decision and helped steady wavering German resolve to support the NATO position 
It is also urging an enhanced and independent European response to the Soviet 
military challenge Moving away from a nationally determined role for nuclear 
weapons, France is willing to station Pluton tactical nuclear missiles in 
Germany President Mitterrand has also voiced interest in reviving the Western 
European Union Such a move would provide a way to promote greater European 
defense cooperation without running afoul French objections to NATO s integrated 
arrangements
The pluralism of the Western camp can also be turned to the West s 
advantage in dealing with the Soviet Union and its East European dominions 
Western diffusion can be seen as a potential means for a more efficient 
diplomatic division of labor The West European states and their peoples are 
the natural bridges to their East European counterparts They have strong 
historic and cultural ties, interdependent economic needs, and a common interest 
in preventing a superpower clash in Europe West Europe is also less 
threatening, partly because of its lack of unity, to the Soviet Union East 
European contacts with the West are often more easily facilitated through Paris, 
Rome, and Brussels than through Washington Strengthening non-bloc East and 
West European ties also provides for greater maneuverability for the East 
European regimes in their dealings with Moscow
There is much to be said for allowing inner-European relations to proceed 
at their pace and to be guided by mutual interest Coordinating them with U S
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moves will neither be tolerated as a modus operandi by the West Europeans nor 
viewed as credible and authentically independent by the East Europeans and the 
Soviet Union Fears that Europe will drift toward neutralism or fall 
unchallenged within the Soviet sphere are exaggerated West Europe s impressive 
defense record since World War II and its current military and economic efforts 
caution against unqualified concern Too narrow a focus on fears inhibits 
European and American statecraft in finding ways to ease tensions and to create 
a more favorable atmosphere for arms reductions than presently exists Greater 
European responsibility for European peace is a key ingredient for managing 
peace in the region
Economic Growth and Development European economic assistance to 
developing states compares favorably with the United States States, like 
France and Sweden, allocate a larger proportion of their wealth measured by per 
capita expenditures to foreign assistance than the United States There is a 
steady flow of European technicians to the developing world Tens of thousands 
of students from the developing world, supported by grants from private and 
public sources, receive advanced training at European universities and 
institutes European investment is an indispensable source of capital ^or 
industrial development European banks have extended billions of dollars in 
credits to developing states The United States neither has the resources nor 
the interest of replacing this elaborate structure of global economic support 
While altruism hardly explains Europe s motives, the fact remains that there is 
no readily available substitute for the stabilizing role that Furope plays in 
the developing world It keep these nations and their markets open and 
Accessible to the Viest and affords an alternative either to closed, collectivist 
solutions to development or to politically entangling dependency on the United
15
States
A word might also be said in favor of building preferential trading blocs 
if Western political and security gains can be registered After World War II, 
the United States created a global security framework within which European 
recovery and worldwide economic expansion were facilitated It can no longer 
shoulder this burden As more of this responsibility shifts to Europe, the 
American dream of a truly liberal economic order, resting on the free movement 
of trade, labor, and capital, will have to be modified A new economic order 
will have to be sensitive to the demands of the developing states for aid, 
concessions, and stable markets, particularly for commodities subject to wide 
price fluctuations in international commerce The European Community has taken 
the lead in responding partially to the needs of the developing states in the 
Lomé accords, which facilitate access of products from these countries to the 
European market Europe s import dependency on oil also encourages privileged 
arrangements with Middle East states Since these preferential agreements serve 
powerful interests, they will not be wished away Reconciling the competing 
requirements of a liberal or preferential system will not be easy The 
political as well as economic health of the Western democracies, however, 
depends on developing a sufficiently flexible perspective and institutional 
mechanism, now lacking, to synchronize, if not conciliate, Western efforts to 
strengthen North-South ties and to improve the domestic economic base of the 
Western states A moratorium on pointless European-Arnerican ideological 
wrangles over economic principles may be a start toward mutual accommodation 
The Reagan administration s Caribbean initiative suggests that American policy 
may also find the extension of privileged trade and investment concessions 
politically useful
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World Order and Western Pluralism The United States  and the West European 
states are likely to be at cross purposes if either atterpts to dictate what the 
West s responses should be to the Eastern bloc or to the developing world The 
divisions within the West are too deep and abiding Power is so diffuse and 
decentralized among the Western states that no one nation, whether a determined 
United States or a willful Gaullist France, can impose its views on the others 
on matters of vital concern to them These constraints on Western cooperation 
and policy coordination are serious, but not necessarily fatal We have to 
remind ourselves periodically of the simple truth that the very core values that 
give the West a measure of cohesion prompt the pluralism characterizing the 
Western system
Pluralism can be an asset It has permitted a wider range of foreign 
policy initiatives, a greater rate of economic growth, and a broader extension 
of personal freedoms than would otherwise have been possible in the postwar 
period through more authoritarian political arrangements The desire of each of 
the Western states to erect its own foreign and security policy structure to 
serve its particular needs is, ironically, a major obstacle to the creation of 
an anti-Western coalition capable of destroying the Western alliance 
Developing states have an interest in keeping a window open to the West by 
preserving their access to one or more of the Western states Expanding the 
present network of relations between individual Western states and developing 
countries blocks Soviet monopolization of these relations Greater East and 
West European ties also inhibit Soviet control over its satellites and, 
complicates, if not erodes, Moscow s ability to impose harsh measures witness 
the Polish or Hungarian case— on East European peoples without paying some price 
for its imperial system These outcomes of Western diplomacy— diplomacies might
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be a better word— are consistent with a pluralistic international environment 
where national rivalries, ethnic, racial, and linguistic differences, unique 
historical and geographical circumstances, and differential rates of domestic 
economic, social and political development divide states and peoples
No one ideology, nor single ordering principle, nor aspiring hegemonic 
power will unify a diffuse and decentralized international system built on 
separate nation-states as contending centers of power and decision without 
risking a self-destructive global conflagration The United States was 
frustrated in its attempt to shape the international system to its liking The 
Soviet Union, as the intervention in Afghanistan and earlier repudiation by 
Fgypt of Soviet tutelage suggests, is confronted with similar limits on its 
power Soviet militarism is a formidable force in international relations, but 
containing it requires more than a military response Western pluralism is more 
responsive to the varied and competing needs of the states and peoples composing 
the global system than the narrow military thrust of the Soviet Union 
Keeping the international system open is the great task of Western 
statecraft— American and European This overriding interest and the core values 
animating it are deeply shared by most Americans and Europeans They are 
reflected in the reinforcing, if not always coordinated, efforts of the nations 
on both sides of the Atlantic to shape a world suited to their needs The 
pursuit of an open system does not imply the creation of an Atlantic community, 
based on integrated transatlantic institutions and unitary mind-sets, however 
attractive this vision may appear Pursuit of common interests and values 
certainly also belies well-meaning but misguided calls for a return to a simpler 
time when American isolationism from Europe s affairs made sense History has 
overtaken old testament doctrine in American foreign policy New testament
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sermonizing has also pro\ed utopian Western divisions preclude harmony, but 
not the need for cooperation and burden sharing to preserve a fragile peace and 
prosperity and to nurture frail personal liberties in a world marked by 
indifference and hostility to these values If American and Europeans, two 
centuries after the American Revolution, must hang together or hang separately, 
they must also learn to "hang loose" in pursing these aims
